

Agency 3-1

**CHATTANOOGA (Tenn.)
TIMES**

Circ.: m. 57,421
S. 87,839

Front Edit Other
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Date: MAY 1 1954

FAREWELL TO KYES

CPYRGHT

President at Luncheon for
Deputy to Wilson
By New York Times News Service.
WASHINGTON, April 30 — President Eisenhower revisited the Pentagon today to attend a farewell luncheon for Roger M. Kyes, outgoing deputy secretary of defense.
Kyes, whose resignation became effective today, is returning to his home in Bloomfield Hills, Mich. He is a former vice president of the General Motors Corp.
For his "outstanding service in furthering the security of the United States" Kyes received the Medal of Freedom, with Eisenhower and Vice President Richard M. Nixon looking on.
The award was presented by Charles E. Wilson, secretary of defense, at a ceremony in his office following the luncheon.
The other luncheon guests included the chiefs and secretaries of the military services, Harold Stassen, director of foreign operations, Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Arthur S. Flemming, director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, Robert Cutler, administrative assistant to the President for National Security Council affairs, and Rowland Hughes, director of the Bureau of the Budget.

among the technologically benighted.

Following this tradition, Bingham uses anecdotes to tell a part of his story; his book is full of wonderful people doing highly interesting things at the grass roots of three continents. But unlike many people who tell the Point Four story this way, he doesn't imply that these stories are an end in themselves. He has the perception and the experience to relate people to politics and production.

Fallacies and Delusions

Thus Bingham complains that the United States has not done much to push land reform. He stresses the dangers in trying to buy gratitude with a "look-what-we're-doing-for-you" publicity effort. He criticizes those who believe whole societies can be changed overnight by the application of American aid—"the almighty dollar fallacy"—and those who think progress comes cheap, giving only technical advice without supplies and equipment to make the advice work—"the bargain-basement delusion." After a persuasive chapter about what private enterprise can—and cannot—do, he suggests a more enterprising search for "a technique of aid falling somewhere between a loan and a grant."

The Eisenhower Administration last year swept away the name Point Four (though it lives on in many languages on three continents) and fired many of the top experts who had been running the show. But more money is being spent this year on technical aid and economic development than was spent in any year under President Truman. The new administrators can learn some hardheaded lessons from *Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy*.

PPOINT FOUR didn't turn out to be a technical or economic program: It was a symbol and start of deep cultural changes in three dozen countries. An old Indian in Bolivia put it this way: "I was born in an evil time, as you can see. When I was young, I had to be silent and listen to my elders, and I longed for the day when I should be grown and able to speak with all authority. Now I am old, and lo! I must be silent and listen to my children."

Generals as Politicians

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH

CPYRGHT

THE NEMESIS OF POWER: THE GERMAN ARMY IN POLITICS, 1918-1945, by John W. Wheeler-Bennett. St. Martin's Press. \$12.

ALTHOUGH IT IS NOW nearly ten years since the event, historians have not yet decided how seriously to take the German generals' revolt of July 20, 1944. Was it a formidable affair that showed there were men of conscience in the officer corps, and did it come within an ace of succeeding? Or was it just another *Putsch* in the tradition of Kapp and the Beer Hall, affirming only the ancient capacity of Germans to talk themselves into romantic, violent, but exceedingly futile enterprises? Not many knew about the revolt until nearly a year after it took place. This has made the task of placing it in history particularly important, for unlike most happenings, this service wasn't rendered automatically by those who write the headlines and news columns.

The best view of this whole episode so far available was published late last year by John W. Wheeler-Bennett, a British historian. The book owes its excellence not only to the author's careful researches but also to the fact that he places the July 20 affair in the full context of the political activities of the German Army in the twenty-seven years following the First World War. It is doubtful if the events of 1944 can be fully understood except in the light of this history. The present comment is meant to be less a review of Mr. Wheeler-Bennett's admirable and often fascinating history than an observation on the way the German generals performed as politicians, with a few asides on generals in politics.

IN MR. WHEELER-BENNETT'S view, the generals' revolt on July 20 was a serious business. It involved a surprisingly large number of leading officers—and the lists of those executed for complicity bear him out. It also had no chance of succeeding. As

during the preceding twenty years, whenever German officers concerned themselves with politics, they were weak, indecisive, and generally foolish. The results, as during the preceding two decades, were totally disastrous.

For a few years after the surrender at Compiègne, the German Army avoided overt participation in politics. During this time, under the wise guidance of General Hans von Seeckt, it protected the Weimar Republic and opposed threats to the constitutional authority, even when the threats came—as in the case of von Lüttwitz, the supporter of Kapp, and of Ludendorff, the ally of Hitler—from reactionary members of the officer corps itself.

But, as the 1920's gave way to the 1930's, this period of formal detachment came to an end. Hindenburg, the relatively untarnished symbol of the wartime achievements, had become President. General Kurt von Schleicher, the Field-gray Eminence, became first a kingmaker and then Chancellor. After the advent of Hitler the army had to fight to protect its prestige and privileges from an invasion by the brown battalions. This was followed by efforts to restrain the seemingly premature and reckless adventures of the Führer and, finally, by the efforts of one part of the officer corps to throw Hitler and his minions out and of another part to reinforce his authority and show their loyalty to National Socialism.

Cowardice and Foolish Courage

It would be hard to find anywhere a record of more nearly unmitigated failure. The superficially adroit maneuverings of von Schleicher paved the way for Hitler; the Buddha-like senility of Hindenburg graced the Nazi take-over. Von Schleicher paid for his maneuvering with his life during the blood purge of June 30, 1934. The army on that night won short-run protection from the Sturm-

2. The Pioneers

HARLAN CLEVELAND

SHORT-SLEEVE DIPLOMACY: POINT 4 IN ACTION, by Jonathan B. Bingham. *John Day*. \$4.

A LITTLE over five years ago as I entered a crowded State Department conference room, the newspapers and the cables from diplomatic posts all over the world were full of excitement about the fourth point of President Truman's Inaugural Address. This was a meeting, said the chairman, to decide two questions: "What sort of a 'bold new program' did the President mean? And what shall we call it?"


Most great political ideas are launched first and worked out afterward. Certainly Mr. Truman's Point Four, which was fitted into a late draft of his Inaugural Address, would never have been uttered if he had asked the experts whether it was feasible. And for eighteen months after his speech, most of the advice he got reflected, not his original intention, but a narrow view and a low horizon.

Anecdotes Plus

Then in October, 1951, Jonathan Bingham joined, as Deputy Administrator, a still undefined program that was still called Point Four simply because nobody was able to think up a short title for "a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas." More than any other one person, Bingham gave the bold new program a shape, a direction, and even a measure of the boldness Mr. Truman had prescribed.

The traditional way to write about Point Four is to tell little stories about little people doing wonderful little things to help themselves. Bingham and others who have tried to interest Congressional committees in technical assistance and economic development discovered early that the arid stretches of testimony about financial needs had to be punctuated by the appearance of tanned and wrinkled American county agents who would describe in earthy language the miracles wrought by "American know-how"

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abteilung (SA) but at the eventual cost of long-run subjection to the far more formidable power of the Schutzstaffel (SS).

Werner von Blomberg, one of the first high officers to accept a position under Hitler (as Minister of War), saw his career come to a sad end when the Nazis, bent on bringing the generals down to size, produced a merry dossier on the earlier career of his new young wife as a prostitute and picturesque figure on illicit postcards. His heir apparent, the Commander in Chief of the Army, Colonel General Freiherr Werner von Fritsch, was immediately rapped with a false charge of homosexuality.

Those who argued against Hitler's political and military designs on Europe were uniformly overruled. Those who carried their opposition to active conspiracy were, with a handful of highly fortuitous exceptions, shot, garroted, hanged, or suspended to death from a meat hook. Or they forestalled these discomforts by suicide. On the whole, those who remained with Hitler to the end were more fortunate, even though some were taken up for war crimes.

THE REASONS for the failure seem fairly clear. A few of the generals were simply cowards. The most fascinating case was that of General Friedrich Fromm, who, as Commander in Chief of the Home Army with headquarters in Berlin, was obviously a decisive figure for the July 20 affair. He collaborated with the conspirators in the early stages of the revolt, and then, when he saw it was going wrong, set strenuously to work to shoot his erstwhile colleagues to prove his loyalty to Hitler. (Hitler was not fooled and had him shot.) General Ludwig Beck, however, the formal leader of the July 20 conspiracy, and Claus von Stauffenberg, who planted the bomb near Hitler, were clearly men of rare physical courage.

What the generals lacked was any sense of political direction and objective. A man who has no knowledge and no very profound convictions as to where he is going is by definition incapable of strong, decisive political action. So it was with the German generals. This weakness was reflected in the fatal maneuver-

ing of von Schleicher and the belief that the tiger of National Socialism could somehow be ridden.

The political vacuum in which the generals operated was even better indicated by the preparations for the July 20 affair. These involved not the neglect of politics but an almost childish preoccupation with irrelevant detail. The form and structure of the new Government were discussed at length, as was the orientation between East and West, and there was endless bickering over the assignment of Cabinet posts. With great armies closing in on the Reich from either side, these were matters on which Germany was not likely long to exercise much choice.

In any case, the simple seizure of power from Hitler was obviously the all-important thing, and that operation was halfheartedly planned. On the day itself, the conspirators spent most of the afternoon sitting in the War Ministry on the Bendlerstrasse arguing over what to do next. (At one juncture they were distressed to hear that the radio was still in Nazi hands, although it is not certain they had made any clear plan to seize it.) At nightfall Hitler, who never lacked a sense of political direction, moved in on the conspirators. The futile lists of would-be officeholders served to finger many of his victims.

Citizens Are Not Privates

At least since the time of Julius Caesar the military man has been supposed to have a particularly strong and virile approach to politics. His are the habits of command; he rejects the dalliances and the compromises and the temporizing of the ordinary politician. Especially when times are tough, he is the kind of man who is needed.

Perhaps this myth had its substance when—as with Caesar, Peter the Great, and Napoleon—political capacity required military prowess, and vice versa. There is no indication whatever that the contemporary professional military man is strong-willed and decisive when he gets into politics.

One would expect the Germans to be particularly weak. More than any other nonclerical caste in modern times, the German officer corps was a world unto itself. A member could

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have pride in his ignorance of politics, business, economics, and other things unbecoming to the general's craft. Accordingly, if one is right in associating political weakness and aimlessness with innocence of the political world, then the German officers would be an extreme case. But the French experience with Weygand and Pétain provides a close parallel. And General de Gaulle has shown an extraordinary capacity for keeping his presumably great political power purely potential.

Since the day of the Duke of Wellington, the British experience with generals in politics has been too slender for analysis, and a good case could be made out that our own generals, by comparison with the continentals, are decidedly a civilian breed. Still, there was General MacArthur—enough of a soldier to have for some a brief canter as a possible man on horseback. General MacArthur's political career, it will now be agreed, was rather inglorious. It involved fighting the wrong battles with the wrong allies at the wrong times. This unfortunate selection may well have been the result of confusing the political strength of allies and the significance of issues with mere capacity to raise a rumpus. Such errors of opportunism can again be attributed to the lack of any clear political goals or purpose. It is significant that Dwight Eisenhower has been most severely criticized not for excessive display of the habits of command but for failure to set a clear course and fight for it.

LACK OF PURPOSE, degenerating into aimlessness, may not be the only source of weakness for the professional soldier in politics. There is also a chance that military command is a poor preparation for politics. In a headquarters, after all, everyone must take orders. An easygoing man can thus give the illusion of great strength. In politics—the American brand before all—there is no compulsion to obey. And the easygoing military man is certain to look ineffectual.

Always allowing for exceptions, we should not expect the product of a professional military career to be a strong and incisive political leader. Our expectations should, in fact, be to the contrary.

Book Notes

CPYRGHT

A LAYMAN'S LOVE OF LETTERS, by G. M. Trevelyan, O.M. Longmans, Green. \$2.50.

THE SPACE allotted this note would not suffice even to list the historical works written by G. M. Trevelyan—the *History of England* (available now in the Doubleday "Anchor" series), *England Under Queen Anne*, *Garibaldi and the Thousand*, and so forth. No one is a more professional historian than Professor Trevelyan, whose father before him was the great biographer of Macaulay.

And yet the specialist in history is an amateur in love with letters: "If I start counting from my nursery days of rapturous devotion to Scott's and Macaulay's Lays at the age of six, I have now for seventy-two years lived and had my being in English literature . . ."

The essays in this civilized book are the Clark Lectures delivered at the University of Cambridge in 1953, and they make up an agreeable although severe admonition. Submerged by contemporary novels, deafened by the uproar over Communism, awed by the premonitory silence that follows each atomic test, we are not reading Byron or Shelley or Keats, Browning or Housman or Meredith. Professor Trevelyan says that "any author who was for a number of years together considered to be a great writer by a large number of the elect spirits of any former age must have some great merit, and if changes of fashion in thought, and in literary taste, now make that merit less obvious, it is none the less there: it is to be sought, or at least it is not to be denied without seeking."

THE POWER OF POSITIVE THINKING, by Norman Vincent Peale. Prentice-Hall. \$2.95.

DR. PEALE'S BOOK has now been No. 1 on the New York Times nonfiction best-seller list for about a year, which puts it in a class with that other easy road to heaven on earth, *How to Win Friends and Influence People*.

Dr. Peale's formula is astonishingly easy. "Never mention the worst.

Never think of it. Drop it out of your consciousness. At least ten times every day affirm, 'I expect the best and with God's help will attain the best.'" If that sentence doesn't work, there are lots of others in the Bible. When somebody comes to Dr. Peale with any kind of unhappiness or neurosis, his unvarying prescription is to select a "positive" sentence from Scripture, and advise the sufferer to carry it around with him and repeat it over and over again.

The book's extraordinary success can hardly be merely the result of positive thinking by Dr. Peale and the sales-promotion department of Prentice-Hall. The reason must be that here is the ultimate in How To Do It books. Since books on how to fix your plumbing sell well, it follows logically that books on how to fix your soul sell even better. Dr. Peale teaches "a simple yet scientific system of practical techniques of successful living that works."

Here is a sample: "It is important to eliminate from conversations all negative ideas, for they tend to produce tension and annoyance inwardly. For example, when you are with a group of people at luncheon, do not comment that the 'Communists will soon take over the country.' In the first place, Communists are not going to take over the country, and by so asserting you create a depressing reaction in the minds of others. It undoubtedly affects digestion adversely. The depressing remark colors the attitude of all present, and everyone goes away with a perhaps slight but definite feeling of annoyance. They also carry away with them a mild but definite feeling that something is wrong with everything. There are times when we must face these harsh questions and deal with them objectively and vigorously, and no one has more contempt for Communism than I have, but as a general thing to have peace of mind, fill your personal and group conversations with positive, happy, optimistic, satisfying expressions."